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Imaging Genetics for Our Neurogenetic
Future
Daniel Z. Buchman & Judy Illes*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Tairyan and Illes outlined the potential challenges
posed by the growing possibility of combining genetic and
neuroimaging information to improve diagnostic and predictive
testing of people with disorders affecting the central nervous
system.1 Here, we continue that discussion with a specific focus
on the potential power and utility of such combined
technologies to accurately predict psychiatric illness,
particularly schizophrenia. We review the science of imaging
genetics, discuss related ethical issues, such as how
endophenotypes construct an at-risk profile, and examine
clinical ethics issues surrounding early intervention in the
context of the emerging capability. We consider how individuals
diagnosed with schizophrenia may embody knowledge from
their brains and genomes into an objective-self. We discuss
possible implications of imaging genetics for the law and how
use of the combined technologies may impact issues of justice.
Finally, we argue that while imaging genetics remains a purely
laboratory technique today, its potential social uses require
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careful reflection on how the knowledge gained from it may be
constructed and interpreted by clinicians, patients, legal
scholars, and the lay public.
II. THE SCIENCE OF IMAGING GENETICS
Brain activation studies combining genetic information and
brain signals from human subjects—now known as imaging
genetics—were first conducted in early 2000.2 These studies
relied on combined information about the DNA of people and
changes in metabolic activity or blood oxygenation as measured
during experiments that involved functional imaging of the
brain.3 Susan Bookheimer and colleagues, for example, showed
that results on functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)
vary depending on the genetic risk of Alzheimer’s disease (AD)
and may predict the course of cognitive decline.4 Eric Reiman
and colleagues also described the use of fMRI, as well as
positron emission tomography (PET), to study brain changes
associated with aging in persons with and without the
apolipoprotein E (APOE) 4 allele, an allele associated with risk
of AD.5 These results, along with others using AD as an early
clinical model, suggested that the dual-technology approach
could provide early biomarkers for the disease even before the
onset of amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles, possibly
improve disease tracking, and advance prevention strategies.6
The promise of this new, combined capability quickly
unleashed a series of studies, such as those on APOE and
memory systems, catechol-o-methyltransferase and the

2. Susan Y. Bookheimer et al., Patterns of Brain Activation in People at
Risk for Alzheimer’s Disease, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 450, 450 (2000).
3. Id. at 451.
4. Id. at 455.
5. Eric M. Reiman, Linking Brain Imaging and Genomics in the Study of
Alzheimer’s Disease and Aging, 1097 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 94, 102–105
(2007); Eric M. Reiman et al., Declining Brain Activity in Cognitively Normal
Apolipoprotein E ε4 Heterozygotes: A Foundation for Using Positron Emission
Tomography to Efficiently Test Treatments to Prevent Alzheimer’s Disease, 98
PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. U.S. 3334, 3335 (2001).
6. See John M. Ringman, What the Study of Persons at Risk for Familial
Alzheimer’s Disease Can Tell Us About the Earliest Stages of the Disorder: A
Review, 18 J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY & NEUROLOGY 228, 231–32 (2005); Eun
Kyoung Ryu & Xiaoyuan Chen, Development of Alzheimer’s Disease Imaging
Agents for Clinical Studies, 13 FRONTIERS BIOSCIENCES 777, 784 (2008); Bart
N.M. van Berckel & Philip Scheltens, Getting a Grip on Alzheimer’s Disease:
Imaging Amyloid in the Brain, 6 LANCET NEUROLOGY 204, 205 (2007).
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prefrontal cortex, and 5-HTT and the amygdala.7 Several
studies focused on common gene variants known to affect
cognitive and behavioral processes within the normal range,
and others on conditions such as attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD),8 depression,9 obsessive-compulsive disorder
(OCD),10 anxiety and stress,11 and schizophrenia.12 Ahmed
Harriri and colleagues used fMRI to study emotional behavior
(anxiety, response to fear) in healthy volunteers with different
5-HTT genotypes, as well as a susceptibility gene for affective
disorders.13 They found that participants carrying the less
efficient s allele of the 5-HTT-promoter gene had an increased
amygdala response to fearful stimuli in comparison to subjects
homozygous for the l allele.14
These developments represent a new era in predictive
medicine. The actual term “predictive medicine” has been
increasingly used by Muin J. Khoury and colleagues to describe
new approaches in genomic medicine, where information
extracted from an individual’s genome identifies whether or not
the person is at an increased risk of developing a specific
condition, such as mutations of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes
7. See generally Venkata S. Mattay & Terry E. Goldberg, Imaging
Genetic Influences in Human Brain Function, 14 CURRENT OPINION
NEUROBIOLOGY 239 (2004) (describing a number of studies using different
brain imaging techniques to explore the association between genetic mutations
and brain function).
8. See Martina T. Mitterschiffthaler et al., Applications of Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging in Psychiatry, 23 J. MAGNETIC RESONANCE
IMAGING 851, 851–53 (2006).
9. Id. at 853–54.
10. Id. at 854–57.
11. Ke Xu et al., Imaging Genomics Applied to Anxiety, Stress Response,
and Resiliency, 4 NEUROINFORMATICS 51 passim (2006).
12. See Guiseppe Blasi & Allesandro Bertolino, Imaging Genomics and
Response to Treatment with Antipsychotics in Schizophrenia, 3
NEUROTHERAPEUTICS 117 (2006); Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg & Daniel R.
Weinberger, Intermediate Phenotypes and Genetic Mechanisms of Psychiatric
Disorders, 7 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 818 (2006).
13. Ahmed R. Hariri et al., Imaging Genetics: Perspectives from Studies of
Genetically Driven Variation in Serotonin Function and Corticolimbic Affective
Processing, 59 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 888, 889 (2006) [hereinafter Hariri et
al., Imaging Genetics]; Ahmed R. Hariri et al., A Susceptibility Gene for
Affective Disorders and the Response of the Human Amygdala, 62 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 146, 146–47 (2005) [hereinafter Hariri et al., Susceptibility
Gene].
14. Hariri et al., Imaging Genetics, supra note 13, at 891; Hariri et al.,
Susceptibility Gene, supra note 13, at 148.

in breast cancer.15 Identifying high-risk candidates allows for
early intervention and disease management.
The alignment of results from imaging genetics on
neurodegenerative disease and psychiatric disorders supports
the hypothesis that the combined method has an
unprecedented power to predict the development of certain
diseases and risky behaviors.16 Imaging genetics could be used
to predict the onset of psychiatric conditions, personality traits,
and mental and emotional capacities in a more powerful way
than ever before. At this time, however, there still remains
much to be studied. Causes of psychiatric conditions are vague
at best, and even categorizing disorders remains a significant
challenge. Thus, it is realistic and prudent to anticipate
increasing study and use of imaging genetics in the years to
come,17 much like other innovations in genetics and
neuroscience separately. It is also imperative to anticipate the
ethical, social, legal, and clinical problems posed by imaging
genetics and to critically examine the value of imaging genetics
to accomplish outcomes proposed.
III. THE ETHICS OF IMAGING GENETICS
Recent advances in knowledge about the neurogenetic
contributions to mental illness have provided an impetus for
the neuroscience, genetics, and medical communities to
contribute to ongoing philosophical, ethical, and legal debates.18
Ethical issues as they apply separately to genetics and
neuroimaging have been a growing focus for applied ethics
research, which has contributed to the rise of particular
subfields of biomedical ethics focused on the ethics of emerging

15. See Muin J. Khoury et al., The Continuum of Translation Research in
Genomic Medicine: How Can We Accelerate the Appropriate Integration of
Human Genome Discoveries into Health Care and Disease Prevention?, 9
GENETICS MED. 665, 668–69 (2007); Muin J. Khoury et al., An Epidemiologic
Assessment of Genomic Profiling for Measuring Susceptibility to Common
Diseases and Targeting Interventions, 6 GENETICS MED. 38, 43–44 (2004);
Muin J. Khoury et al., Population Screening in the Age of Genomic Medicine,
348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 50, 50 (2003).
16. Mattay & Goldberg, supra note 7, at 239.
17. See George J. Annas, Foreword: Imagining a New Era of
Neuroimaging, Neuroethics, and Neurolaw, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 163, 163–64
(2007) (discussing the prospective legal uses of neuroimaging).
18. Emily R. Murphy & Judy Illes, Neuroethics and Psychiatry: New
Collaborations for Emerging Challenges, 37 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 798, 803
(2007).
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technologies, such as genethics and neuroethics.19 Here, we
examine the ethical issues raised by imaging genetics
technologies through the lens of biological psychiatry
(biopsychiatry). Biopsychiatry is a subfield within medicine
concerned with the function of the central nervous system in
mental illness. Since neuroethics is concerned, in part, with
ethical issues arising in the application of technologies in the
brain sciences, biopsychiatry falls within the scope of
neuroethics.20
In the past, we and others with interest in neuroethics and
biopsychiatry have discussed the ethical dimensions of genetics
compared to other approaches to understanding brain health
and illness.21 In one study, Tairyan and Illes performed a
comprehensive Medline literature search to explore if ethics
has had a presence in journal articles using the specific term
“imaging genetics” and found no relevant peer-reviewed
publications.22 To our knowledge, the only publication with
content specifically addresses the intersection of ethics and
imaging genetics is a book chapter by Turhan Canli.23 This
chapter argues that the future integration of genetic and
neuroimaging data would predict narrowly defined forms of
behavior better than self-report and other behavioral
measures.24 In response, Tairyan and Illes developed a model
building directly on the work of Joshua L. Roffman and
colleagues.25 Following the Roffman et al. continuum from
19. See id. at 799.
20. Neil Levy & Steve Clark, Neuroethics and Psychiatry, 21 CURRENT
OPINION PSYCHIATRY 568, 568 (2008).
21. See, e.g., Thomas Fuchs, Ethical Issues in Neuroscience, 19 CURRENT
OPINION PSYCHIATRY 600, 601–602 (2006); Judy Illes et al., ELSI Priorities for
Brain Imaging, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS, Mar.–Apr. 2006, at W24, W27–28, W29–
30; Judy Illes, et al., From Neuroimaging to Neuroethics, 6 NATURE
NEUROSCIENCE, 205, 205 (2003); Judy Illes, Neuroethics in a New Era of
Neuroimaging, 14 AM. J. NEURORADIOLOGY, 1739, 1739–40 (2003); Katherine
I. Morley et al., Genetic Screening for Susceptibility to Depression: Can We and
Should We?, 38 AUSTRALIAN & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 73, 77–78 (2004).
22. Tairyan & Illes, supra note 1, at 13.
23. Turhan Canli, When Genes and Brains Unite: Ethical Implications of
Genomic Neuroimaging, in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY,
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 169–83 (Judy Illes ed., 2006).
24. Id. at 181.
25. Tairyan & Illes, supra note 1, at 2–5. For further information on what
Tairyan and Illes’s model is based on, see Joshua L. Roffman et al.,
Neuroimaging-Genetic Paradigms: A New Approach to Investigate the
Pathophysiology and Treatment of Cognitive Deficits in Schizophrenia, 14

genes to clinical features with neuroimaging at the interface,
Tairyan and Illes modified the original framework to include
some potential ethical issues.26 These include the proposed
challenges of disease differentiation, incidental findings, values
of privacy and autonomy, societal beliefs and attitudes,
resource allocation for research and health care, and
commercialization.27 Similarly to the result of the Roffman et
al. continuum that produces clinical practice considerations,
Tairyan and Illes point to preliminary considerations for health
care, social justice, and policy.28
Deeper reflection on the ethics of imaging genetics in
biopsychiatry is a logical next step. An ethically responsible
approach to address the possible social, clinical, and legal
implications of current scientific research will require an
assessment of the proposed promises and potential outcomes of
that research. A close examination of how knowledge produced
by imaging genetics may have an impact on the identity of the
individual will facilitate thinking of how the law, society, and
psychiatry define the normal brain and mental illness, and
label someone as “at risk.” For example, a statistical deviation
from the norm in psychiatric imaging research does not
necessarily confirm pathology29 (for example, depression), or
rather, somewhat rhetorically, does not confirm that one has a
“depressed” brain as opposed to a “normal” brain.30 There is a
tendency toward this binary distinction even though a so-called
“normal” brain has yet to be described empirically. Imaging
genetics may consequently lead to a paradigmatic shift in
psychiatric classification by constructing “normal” and
“abnormal” from a complex integration of correlations statistics
and risk ratios.
How might advances in imaging genetics provide empirical
information advancing the understanding of human
subjectivity and the self, as well as the application of emerging
predictive technologies in biological psychiatry? Psychiatric
illness may highlight the basis of human subjectivity, such as
HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 78 (2006).
26. Tairyan & Illes, supra note 1, at 3.
27. Id. at 4.
28. Id.
29. Alison C. Boyce, Neuroimaging in Psychiatry: Evaluating the Ethical
Consequences for Patient Care, 23 BIOETHICS 349, 350 (2009).
30. See Joseph Dumit, Is It Me or My Brain? Depression and
Neuroscientific Facts, 24 J. MED. HUMAN. 35, 37 (2003).

ILLES LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

3/9/2010 11:26 AM

IMAGING GENETICS

85

the neurological and genetic underpinnings of selfhood. We will
specifically examine these questions using the current
diagnostic construct of schizophrenia from the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV)31 as a model.
A. THE SCHIZOPHRENIA SPECTRUM AND IMAGING GENETICS
Schizophrenia affects up to 1 percent of the population, is
up to 81 percent heritable, and is characterized by
hallucinations, delusions, and cognitive deficits.32 Many
individuals who experience symptoms of schizophrenia have a
difficult time negotiating their sense of integrated and active
intentionality.33 More specifically, thoughts, actions, and the
self may be perceived as under the control of an external force
or being.34 Conversely, the self may be perceived as
transcendent, omnipotent, or even prophetic.35 Schizophrenia is
a useful case example because of the extensive research into
genetics and neuroscience separately and jointly, the major
health impact on the population, the putative role of biological
factors in its etiology, and the complex interaction of both
genetics and environment in the causation and pathogenesis of
disease.
We restrict our discussion of schizophrenia to the
prodromal phase that occurs prior to the onset of symptoms,
when the individual first notices some change in him or her
self, and the first episode or break. The first episode tends to
occur in men in their late teens or early twenties and in women
a few years later.36 Depending on the legal age of adulthood in
a person’s jurisdiction, individuals may still be a minor when
symptoms appear. For our purposes, the prodromal phase
represents the core features of schizophrenia, as opposed to the
31. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 298 (4th ed. Text Revision 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IVTR].
32. Patrick F. Sullivan et al., Schizophrenia as a Complex Trait: Evidence
from a Meta-Analysis of Twin Studies, 60 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1187,
1190 (2003).
33. Thomas Fuchs, The Temporal Structure of Intentionality and Its
Disturbance in Schizophrenia, 40 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 229, 234 (2007).
34. Id. at 233–34.
35. See Louis A. Sass, Schizophrenia, Self-Consciousness and the Modern
Mind, in MODELS OF THE SELF 319, 320 (Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Shear
eds., 1999).
36. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 31, at 307.

symptoms that individuals suffer in a more chronic stage of
disease that may be confounded by years of social isolation and
the long-term effects of older generation anti-psychotics.37
Given the possible predictive power of imaging genetics, and
the possible benefit to the individual of early detection and
intervention, it is here that we focus our attention.
B. ENDOPHENOTYPES AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF RISK
Identifying individuals at risk for a particular medical or
social condition such as depression or poverty is common
practice in many fields and not unique to psychiatry. In the
clinical neurosciences, recent focus has been placed on
biomarkers and endophenotypes. A biomarker is a biological
marker that is “objectively measured and evaluated as an
indicator of normal biological processes, pathogenic processes,
or pharmacological responses to a therapeutic intervention.”38
Endophenotypes are “intermediate phenotypes . . . measurable
(though often subclinical), heritable biological markers that
relate both to underlying pathophysiology and to clinical
symptoms.”39 In the past, both psychiatric research and clinical
practice have encountered difficulties with identifying a
biological vulnerability to this mental illness. The creation of
endophenotypes may ease this complexity by identifying
biological markers indicating a susceptibility to developing a
mental illness prior to the onset of symptoms.40 The use of
neuroimaging in the endophenotype analysis of complex
psychiatric diseases may shed light on the biological
mechanisms underlying these conditions.41 As expected,
endophenotypes are becoming an increasingly critical notion in
biological psychiatry.
Schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders are currently
37. See DAN ZAHAVI, SUBJECTIVITY AND SELFHOOD 134 (2005) (“[E]arly
symptoms detectable in the first (initial) prodromal stage . . . might, in a much
sharper manner, express the essential core of the illness.”); Josef Parnas &
Louis A. Sass, Self, Solipsism, and Schizophrenic Delusions, 8 PHIL.
PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 101, 117, 117n.1 (2001) (describing the prodromal
phase as “heralding the onset of imminent psychosis” and suggesting that
etiological research focus on the early stages of the disease).
38. Biomarkers Definitions Working Group, Biomarkers and Surrogate
Endpoints: Preferred Definitions and Conceptual Framework, 69 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 89, 91 (2001).
39. Roffman, supra note 25, at 79.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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defined and diagnosed based on symptoms as classified by the
DSM-IV and the International Classification of Disease (ICD10)42, in addition to the reports of patients and their families.
Accordingly, identifying a biomarker or endophenotype through
neuroimaging genetic tools, rather than relying on symptoms
checklists and clinical phenomenology, may provide a more
precise method of prediction and diagnosis.
Recent studies of imaging genetics in schizophrenia have
focused on the biomarkers of COMT, 43 PCM1, 44 and DISC1.45
Michael F. Egan and colleagues have, examined the
relationship between functional polymorphisms of the catecholO-methyltransferase (COMT) gene and regulation of prefrontal
dopamine that is associated with the genetic risk of
schizophrenia.46 The authors studied the effect of COMT
genotype on prefrontal physiology during a working memory
task and found that a low met allele load (number of
mutations) consistently predicted a more efficient physiological
response in the prefrontal cortex.47
Several imaging studies with adolescents believed to be at
high risk for schizophrenia found notable structural and
functional impairments observed in key brain regions.48
42. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL
CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES AND RELATED HEALTH PROBLEM (10th revision
2007), available at http://apps.who.int/classifications/apps/icd/icd10online/.
43. Michael F. Egan et al., Effect of COMT Val108/158 Met Genotype on
Frontal Lobe Function and Risk for Schizophrenia, 98 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
U.S. 6917, 6920 (2001).
44. Hugh M. D. Gurling et al., Genetic Association and Brain Morphology
Studies and the Chromosome 8p22 Pericentriolar Material1 (PCM1) Gene in
Susceptibility to Schizophrenia, 63 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 844, 849
(2006).
45. Neeltje E. van Haren et al., Genetic Genes and Structural Brain
Imaging in Schizophrenia, 21 CURRENT OPINION PSYCHIATRY 161, 163 (2008).
46. Egan et al., supra note 43, at 6917.
47. Id. at 6919.
48. See, e.g., Stefan J. Borgwardt et al., Structural Brain Abnormalities in
Individuals with an At-Risk Mental State Who Later Develop Psychosis, 51
BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY s69, s72–73 (2007); Sven Haller et al., Can Cortical
Thickness Asymmetry Analysis Contribute to Detection of At-Risk Mental State
and First-Episode Psychosis?: A Pilot Study, 250 RADIOLOGY 212, 217 (2009);
Peter Milev et al., Initial Magnetic Resonance Imaging Volumetric Brain
Measurements and Outcomes in Schizophrenia: A Prospective Longitudinal
Study with 5-Year Follow-Up, 54 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 608, 612 (2003);
Christos Pantelis et al., Neuroanatomical Abnormalities Before and After
Onset of Psychosis: A Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal MRI Comparison, 361
LANCET 281, 285–86 (2003).

Specifically, participants had low levels of grey matter volume
in the frontal and temporal lobes and cingulate gyrus,49 key
areas associated with cognition and executive function such as
decision-making and self-monitoring. Most importantly, these
studies demonstrated that researchers can construct an image
of risk from a brain scan that could be predictive of psychosis or
schizophrenia.50
The implications of both neuro- and gene-profiling of
individuals very early in life for a psychiatric illness might
qualitatively differ from the implications of profiling other
medical conditions in childhood and adolescence.51 An extensive
literature discusses the ethics of clinical and non-clinical uses
of pediatric neuroimaging, from the fetus to the neonate to the
adolescent.52 Although a number of ethical issues continue to
be discussed, this paper is concerned with the ethical duties to
minimize risk and maximize benefit, as well as the duty to
appropriately and thoroughly describe the risks and benefits of
imaging genetics for potential translation from bench to
bedside.53 While some risks are associated with safety and
efficacy, other ethical challenges involve describing the
information produced by imaging genetics completely,
accurately and meaningfully.54
If endophenotypes for schizophrenia are detected during
pediatric screening, children might be subjected to invasive and
potentially harmful interventions. For example, prescribing
psychopharmaceutical medication for children with conditions
such as attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder is on the rise.55
Early intervention in psychosis has a demonstrable benefit for

49. See, e.g., Pantelis et al., supra note 48, at 285.
50. See, e.g., id. at 287 (stating that data from the authors’ study raise the
possibility that MRI or other methods can determine which individuals at high
risk for schizophrenia will develop psychosis).
51. Ilina Singh & Nikolas Rose, Biomarkers in Psychiatry, 460 NATURE
202 (2009).
52. E.g., Andrew Fenton et al., Ethical Challenges and Interpretive
Difficulties with Non-Clinical Applications of Pediatric fMRI, 9 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 3, 6–8 (2009).
53. See Jocelyn Downie & Jennifer Marshall, Pediatric Neuroimaging
Ethics, 16 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 147, 149 (2007).
54. Id.
55. See Rick Mayes et al., ADHD and the Rise in Stimulant Use Among
Children, 16 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 151, 151 (2008) (noting the
“unprecedented jump” that occurred in the 1990s in the number of children
using drugs such as stimulants for ADHD).
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prognosis.56 Therefore, it is foreseeable that children who are
carriers of certain biomarkers or endophenotypes for
schizophrenia may be prescribed psychotropic medications
prior to the onset of symptoms. This clinical evaluation
requires a particularly careful examination because of the
recent Food and Drug Administration warnings of the
increased risk of suicide in children and adolescents who are
prescribed
selective
serotonin/norepinephrine
reuptake
inhibitors (e.g., fluexotine and venlafaxine).57 In addition,
children metabolize psychopharmaceuticals differently than
adults, likely due to ways in which genetics modulate the
activity of enzymes in drug metabolism.58 The administration
of pharmaceuticals on the basis of predictive diagnostic criteria
could result in the emergence of an iatrogenic disorder.59 Overtreating with antipsychotics based on a vague understanding of
risk variables is unsupported.
Individuals tend to experience their first episode of
psychosis at an age when the law may not permit them to
provide consent to their own treatment.60 Thus, early
identification of biomarkers may raise questions about the
decisional capacity of both children and adolescents, as well as
their ability to appreciate the risks and benefits associated with
early intervention for psychosis. Concerns about mental
competence may be particularly troublesome for some older
adolescents who may be beginning to enjoy some liberty in
other areas of their lives and, perhaps, even some autonomy in
their own medical decision-making. Balancing duties to protect
children and adolescents when they may be most vulnerable,
while negotiating space for autonomy, will be a significant
challenge.
Skepticism exists about whether data averaged over
groups of participants, a common practice in research studies
56. Richard Jed Wyatt & Ioline D. Henter, The Effects of Early and
the Long-Term Morbidity of Schizophrenia, 32 J.
(1998).
57. Mark Olfson et al., Antidepressant Drug Therapy and Suicide in
Severely Depressed Children and Adults: A Case-Control Study, 63 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 865, 865, 867 (2006).
58. Anders Rane, Phenotyping of Drug Metabolism in Infants and
Children: Potentials and Problems, 104 PEDIATRICS 640 passim (1999).
59. Walter Glannon, Neuroethics, 20 BIOETHICS 37, 44 (2006).
60. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 31, at 307 (stating that the age of onset
for schizophrenia typically begins in the late teens).
Sustained Intervention on
PSYCHIATRIC RES. 169, 170

with either adults or children, can truly predict pathology in a
robust way for a specific person.61 Research that examines
endophenotypes in schizophrenia tends to have limited effect
sizes, as studies rely on group averages with respect to brain
features62 and use small samples. Therefore, the picture
produced by imaging studies of the “schizophrenic” brain, for
example, is not of the brain of any specific person, let alone the
brain of an actual human being.63 Research that seeks to
elucidate pathology on an individual level must consider the
differences of human structural, metabolic and chemical brain
signatures; clinically this diversity will have an inevitable
impact on monitoring of therapeutic interventions.64 If used in
isolation, endophenotypes may not be strong indicators of the
existence of pathology: the endophenotype represents a
correlation, rather than a causal explanation.65 Due to the high
rates of intra- and inter-individual variability, at this time it
would be premature to depend on images of brains with activity
linked to genetic effects as objective clinical or legal evidence.66
The identification of clinically relevant endophenotypes
will require a combined focus on clinical phenomenology,
narratives, personal and family history, molecular and genetic
markers,
neuroanatomical,
neurophysiological,
and
neurocognitive processing mechanisms.67 Biomarkers, and by
extension endophenotypes, will thus remain merely a
statistical probability for the time being.

61. See Grace E. Jackson, A Curious Consensus: “Brain Scans Prove
Disease”?, 8 ETHICAL HUM. PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 55, 57–58 (2006).
62. See id. at 58.
63. Id.
64. Laura Huber, Imaging the Brain: Visualising “Pathological Entities”?:
Searching for Reliable Protocols Within Psychiatry and Their Impact on the
Understanding of Psychiatric Diseases, 6 POIESIS & PRAXIS 27, 32 (2009).
65. See id. at 33–34.
66. See Dara S. Manoach et al., Test-Retest Reliability of a Functional
MRI Working Memory Paradigm in Normal and Schizophrenic Subjects, 158
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 955, 958 (2001) (stating that study findings suggest it is
important to demonstrate reliability in repeated fMRI studies of schizophrenic
subjects).
67. See Jason Scott Robert, Gene Maps, Brain Scans, and Psychiatric
Nosology, 16 CAMBRIDGE. Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 209, 215–16 (2007)
(advocating an integrative approach to the identification of endophenotypes).
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C. IMAGING GENETICS AND THE OBJECTIVE-SELF IN
SCHIZOPHRENIA
Both health professionals and the lay public have a vested
interest in achieving positive health outcomes. Since scientific
and technological research is the portal to modern knowledge
about health and illness, the desire for improved health
outcomes may result in an increased attribution of objectivity
by physicians and patients to brain scans and genetic data.68
This dialectical process is what Joseph Dumit refers to as the
objective-self: the “set of acts that concerns our brains and our
bodies deriving from received-facts of science and medicine.”69
The objective-self is how people understand brains and bodies
as biologic material. Objective-selves challenge generally
accepted notions of normality as the “normal” brain is
compared to its abnormal counterpart.70
The possible consequences of imaging genetics screening in
psychiatry, and for schizophrenia specifically, requires ethical
examination of the potential impact of an objective-self. One
concern is the communication of risk. Inappropriate
communication of imaging genetics information may affect a
person’s perception of his ability to manage symptoms.
Statistics, including measures of probability and risk, are
difficult to comprehend, and framing effects—especially as
people try to comprehend odds ratios—can influence their
interpretation of the information.71 Using imaging genetics
tools to screen for psychopathology may inadvertently elevate
levels of fear and anxiety about developing a mental illness.
The fear of being at risk for a self-altering disorder such as
schizophrenia may affect choices a person makes for education,
employment, or other social and life plans. Indeed, a disorder of
the self may also impact the extent to which ambitious life
goals are supported by friends and family.72
68. Christian G. Huber, Interdependence of Theoretical Concepts and
Neuroimaging Data, 6 POIESIS & PRAXIS 203, 205 (2009).
69. Dumit, supra note 30, at 39.
70. See id. at 39–40.
71. See A. J. Lloyd, The Extent of Patients’ Understanding of the Risk of
Treatment, 10 QUALITY HEALTH CARE i14, i17 (2001) (stating that “[w]hile
clinicians typically report risk information as percentages or relative risks, . . .
people may code information qualitatively.”).
72. Cheryl Corcoran et al., Prodromal Interventions for Schizophrenia
Vulnerability: The Risks of Being “At Risk”, 73 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 173, 177
(2005).

Moreover, the way in which the candidate gene is
expressed in the brain may become intimately linked with
personal identity. The objective-self and identity may be
considered schizophrenic if both the genes and the brain are
affected. A schizophrenic identity may be further embedded in
societal and cultural attitudes, and in the experiences of an
affected individual in the world.
D. IMAGING GENETICS AND FALSE POSITIVES
Imaging genetics is a combined process: it involves both a
genome scan and a brain scan, and the two types of knowledge
produced are expected to be in a causal relationship. Given the
increasing trend toward genome-wide association studies in
biopsychiatry, there is a rapidly growing pool of information on
the neuronal expression of genes. The identification of
numerous prospective endophenotypes raises the problem of
false positives, because candidate genes—including those not
well understood—will be directly linked to imaged brain
structures and function. For our purposes, false positives will
be defined in two ways. First, false positives will be erroneous
conclusions made after a gene variant of unclear relevance is
linked with high-dimensional imaging information.73 This
extends to a second, looser definition, borrowing from Jerome
Wakefield, that false positives may be “non-disorder” conditions
that meet some or the majority of the criteria for a disorder
such as schizophrenia.74 The individual is thus treated—in both
the medical and relational sense—as a member of the
diagnostic group.

73. Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg et al., False Positives in Imaging Genetics,
40 NEUROIMAGE 655, 659 (2008) (stating that “given the absence of reliable
information on the heritability and reliability of the majority of imaging
phenotypes in current usage, a statistically significant result in neuroimaging
is by itself not sufficient to establish that a given polymorphism is functional,
and the complex nature of psychiatric disease predicts that the isolated
genetics evidence for association will usually not be unequivocal for a given
variant.”).
74. Jerome C. Wakefield & Michael First, Clarifying the Distinction
Between Disorder and Non-Disorder: Confronting the Overdiagnosis (“False
Positives”) Problem in DSM-V, in ADVANCING DSM: DILEMMAS IN
PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS 23, 24 (Katharine A. Phillips et al. eds., 2003); see
generally, ALAN V. HOROWITZ & JEROME C WAKEFIELD, THE LOSS OF
SADNESS: HOW PSYCHIATRY TRANSFORMED NORMAL DISORDER INTO
DEPRESSIVE DISORDER (2007); Jerome C. Wakefield, What Makes a Mental
Disorder Mental?, 13 PHIL. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 123, 129 (2006) (arguing
that “some mental disorders may not involve neurologic dysfunction”).
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At this time, only a few select biomarkers and
endophenotypes represent a somewhat reliable indication of
increased risk for psychiatric illness. Even if the reliability,
validity, and specificity of imaging genetic tests are improved
for schizophrenia, some number of false positives and
diagnostic errors will still occur. Effective treatments must be
developed in order for false positive rates even as low as 5
percent75 to be tolerated.76 How the information produced by
imaging genetics, including false-positive results, will be
handled by the law is the topic to which we turn next.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAW AND JUSTICE
A. NEUROGENETICS AND THE LAW
There has been considerable discussion in academic
literature about the current and potential uses of neuroscience
and neurotechnology in the legal system,77 particularly because
of the concern that the law has with mental states.78 When
DNA evidence was first admitted in the courts, it became a
powerful evidentiary tool, not because it demonstrated the
existence of mental states, but because it represented
seemingly objective and indisputable hard facts.79 The

75. See Meyer-Lindenberg et al., supra note 73, at 659 (stating that
expected statistical rate of false positives is 5 percent).
76. Cf. Judy Illes et al., Prospects for Prediction: Ethics Analysis of
Neuroimaging in Alzheimer’s Disease, 1097 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 278, 283
(2007) (stating that, in the context of neuroimaging for Alzheimer’s Disease,
“[t]he ethical issues pertaining to which clinical populations should be tested
will depend largely on whether or not a definitive treatment becomes
available.”).
77. See, e.g., Neil K. Aggarwal, Neuroimaging, Culture and Forensic
Psychiatry, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY& L. 239, 240 (2009); Henry T. Greely
& Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for
Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 390–94, 405–20 (2007) ); Joshua Greene
& Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775,
1775–76, 1778–81 (2004); Owen D. Jones, Law, Evolution, and the Brain:
Applications and Open Questions, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y:
BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1697 passim (2004); Susan M. Wolf, Neurolaw: The Big
Question, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 21, 21–22 (2008).
78. See Greene & Cohen, supra note 77, at 1775.
79. See Jay D. Aronson, DNA Fingerprinting on Trial: The Dramatic
History of a New Forensic Technique, 29 ENDEAVOUR 126, 128 (2005) (stating
that “by early 1986, DNA evidence had been accepted by the [U.K.]
magistrate’s court as valid and reliable”).

combined use of DNA and imaging genetics information might
provide a similarly powerful tool, and, instead, may offer more
reliable and valid evidence of the existence of limited mental
capacity or cognitive deficits commonly associated with a
condition, even before an individual is symptomatic. Initially,
the threat of introducing DNA evidence was an influential and
intimidating tactic, which, at times, distracted the jury’s
attention from its status as an “untried and untested
technology.”80 At the present time, use of imaging genetics
information as legal evidence is far from reality, particularly
since neuroimaging data themselves are not ready for legal
prime time.
The presence or absence of genetic or clinical traits
associated with a condition such as schizophrenia does not
itself cause illicit behavior or even a disorder itself.81 Many
individuals who are not carriers or do not have full-blown
psychiatric conditions have committed many crimes.
Conversely, those with the genes or condition may commit no
illicit acts. What the presence of risk traits does imply,
however, is that the pre-symptomatic individual may already
possess certain difficulties relating to cognitive function and
mental capacity. A positive result in an imaging genetics study
could be used to argue against the mental competence to stand
trial.82 In other cases, this information may be used to argue
that the individual does not have the requisite mens rea to be
found guilty of certain offense, and thus can be used to support
a less retributive sentence.83
B. NEUROGENETICS AND JUSTICE
A more immediate and pragmatic challenge posed by the
production of imaging genetics knowledge concerns the ethical
issue of justice. Justice necessitates consideration of the
potential harms that may arise for individuals or communities
resulting from research participation, or in clinical

80. Id. at 126; Patrick Haines, Embracing the DNA Fingerprint Act, 5 J.
ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 629, 640 (2007).
81. Jerome C. Wakefield, The Measurement of Mental Disorder, in A
HANDBOOK FOR THE STUDY OF MENTAL HEALTH 29, 39–40, 57 (Alan V.
Horwitz & Teresa L. Scheid eds., 1999).
82. Walter Sinnot-Armstrong et al., Brain Images as Legal Evidence, 5
EPISTEME 359, 360 (2008).
83. Greene & Cohen, supra note 77, at 1775, 1783; Sinnot-Armstrong et
al., supra note 82 at, 360.
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implementation of, or interaction with, the technology. In the
spirit of John Rawls’s “distributive justice,”84 justice involves
fairness in not only the equitable distribution of risks, but also
in the equitable distribution and access to research benefits
and clinical technology.
The ethics of predictive genetics in the United States has
been widely discussed, especially in the context of insurability
and employability.85 Similar scholarly and policy initiatives
have been emerging for neuroimaging. Key ethical issues are
privacy and confidentiality.86 One issue of continuing concern is
how health insurers and employers may use genetic or imaging
knowledge that suggests a possibility of a pre-existing disorder
to prevent people from accessing health insurance. Diagnosing
asymptomatic individuals early in life may raise concerns
similar to those at issue raised by newborn screening.
Protection of confidentiality and ensuring privacy of genetic
and imaging information are of particular importance. For a
highly stigmatized condition such as schizophrenia, these
challenges are compounded.
Positive steps have recently been taken at the federal level
with
the
enactment
of
the
Genetic
Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).87 Though not a panacea, GINA
moves to ensure that results from predictive genetic testing will
not be an impediment to receiving medical insurance or gaining
employment.88 While ethical issues of discrimination, privacy,
and confidentiality of information are not unique to
schizophrenia or genetics, as technologies such as imaging
genetics become more sensitive and powerful, information
derived from the genome will impact all aspects of health care
84. See generally JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT
(Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
85. E.g., Paul W. Brandt-Rauf & Sherry I. Brandt-Rauf, Genetic Testing in
the Workplace: Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications, 15 AM. REV. PUB.
HEALTH 139 (2004); K.G. Fulda & K.Lykens, Ethical Issues in Predictive
Genetic Testing: A Public Health Perspective, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 143, 144
(2006).
86. See, e.g., Jinger G. Hoop, Ethical Considerations in Psychiatric
Genetics, 16 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 322, 329 (2008) (discussing the potential
unfairness that genetic information could produce in the insurance context).
87. Pub. L. No. 110–233, 122 Stat. 188 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 29 U.S.C.); see also Kathy L. Hudson et al., Keeping Pace with the
Times – The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 358 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2661, 2661 (2009).
88. Hudson et al., supra note 87, at 2662.

and social services.
If imaging genetics proves both reliable and valid, existing
divisions in access to health care will also be affected. If
imaging genetic tests were to become a standard of care or
commercialized, or made available to individuals universally or
through third-party coverage, the potential impact on the
public health systems could be vast. By contrast, because
psychiatric illness disproportionately affects lower-income
populations89 and public forms of health care insurance remain
hotly debated, financial barriers might significantly limit
access to neuroimaging genetic technologies for the very people
most likely to benefit from them.
Large-scale screening procedures can only be justified on
social, economic, and ethical grounds if sustainable follow-up is
in place for people identified as being high-risk and if a reliable,
effective, and safe treatment is available.90 Scientific and
technological development of imaging genetics, with robust
clinical trials testing early intervention for asymptomatic highrisk individuals, will determine whether early intervention for
those identified by imaging genetics will reduce morbidity and
mortality, and will improve quality of life.91
V. CONCLUSION
Humans have an insatiable appetite for information and
innovation. History shows that when a new medical device or
method is rolled out after proven validity in the laboratory,
demand for that innovation is great. Currently, the ability of
neuroscience and genetics—applied together or separately—to
offer a robust explanation of psychiatric disorders is not yet
demonstrated due to many remaining methodological and
epistemological limitations.92 As Meyer-Lindenberg et al.
assert:
[G]iven the absence of reliable information on the heritability and

89. See NAT’L CTR FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2008 WITH SPECIAL FEATURE ON
THE HEALTH OF YOUNG ADULTS 30 (2008).
90. See Illes et al., supra note 76 at 283–85 (proposing criteria for use of
screening for Alzheimer’s disease).
91. See Wayne D. Hall et al., The Prediction of Disease Risk in Genomic
Medicine, 5 EUR. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORG. REP. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S22, S25
(2004).
92. See generally Wakefield & First, supra note 74, at 23–56 (noting the
shortcomings of the DSM definition of mental disorder).
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reliability of the majority of imaging phenotypes in current usage, a
statistically significant result in neuroimaging is by itself not
sufficient to establish that a given polymorphism is functional, and
the complex nature of psychiatric disease predicts that the isolated
genetics evidence for association will usually not be unequivocal for a
given variant.93

The ability to better predict psychiatric illness could lead to
improved diagnosis and treatment through the early
identification of individuals who are at high biological risk.
Benefits may follow from earlier treatment options, both for
individuals and for society more generally. At the very least,
imaging genetics may reinforce the strong organic component of
psychiatric illness. However, risks of a biopsychiatry that
focuses only on the combination of abnormal brain mechanisms
and genetics, rather than on the integrated person as a beingamong-others, must be minimized. It is currently too early to
suggest that imaging genetics will become a clinical reality or
tool for legal decision-making; too many scientific and
technological problems regarding the application of the
technology remain to be solved. Nonetheless, now is the time to
consider the ethical, legal, and social issues, in order to ensure
benefit and impact for the future. There has been too little
consideration of these issues in imaging genetics—a powerful
technology linking neuroscience and genetics. This gap can be
filled by interdisciplinary collaboration and attention to public
health and legal challenges. Efforts to fill that gap must
integrate societal, clinical, and legal implications in a way that
is both pragmatic and open-minded.94 Meanwhile, the science
calls for more work. Further evaluation and empirical testing is
needed for many conditions that affect executive function and
decision-making, including schizophrenia.

93. Meyer-Lindenberg et al., supra note 73 at 659.
94. Adrian Carter et al., Scare-Mongering and the Anticipatory Ethics of
Experimental Technologies, 9 AM. J. BIOETHICS 47, 48 (2009) (arguing for a
focus on plausible potential harms from participation in clinical trials).

